Colin Liddell, American Renaissance, November 18, 2014
White Americans are “scheduled” to become a minority around about 2042, although they will continue to be the majority of voters for a few years longer. This trend is usually greeted with pessimism and hand-wringing by race realists, but at some point it will almost certainly create a surge of racially conscious white political power.
Already there are signs that whites are starting to think, feel, and vote like a minority–placing their identity and group interests first–and this trend to vote identity over policies will only increase.
In the 2012 presidential election, the vote in several Southern states reflected what can only be incipient white racial consciousness. Mr. Romney won no less than 89 percent of the white vote in Mississippi, 84 percent in Alabama and Louisiana, and more than 70 percent in Georgia and South Carolina. In the country as a whole, only 35 percent of white men voted for Mr. Obama (42 percent of white women voted for him), in an election that saw a decline in white turnout compared to 2008.
The recent midterm elections continued this trend, with white men voting Republican two to one. The midterms also had a low turnout, but that cuts both ways: A higher turnout might only increase the white vote for what is the default white party.
Increased identitarianism and increased apathy, while appearing to be opposites, are actually two sides of the same coin and part of the pattern that arises as a political system that is based on differences of political and economic ideas transitions into an ethnopolitical system.
As demographic changes make race increasingly salient, increasing numbers of voters feel apathy for parties like the two main parties in America that do not overtly express a racial identity. At the same time, voters with ethnic and racial affinities try to project that identity onto parties that are not expressly identitarian.
Apathy is clearly driving the lower-than-normal white vote in recent elections. As for the projection of identity onto non-identitarian parties, this has been going on for decades, with Jews, Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians voting Democratic and Southern whites voting Republican, regardless of conflicting economic or social issues.
At some point, however, the identitarian voting patterns will express themselves more consistently, at first in a coded way but then with a tendency towards increasing explicitness. American politics are still largely at the coded stage–with an extra layer of denial serving only to confirm this–but the trend is unmistakable. As this trend develops, we can expect to see less apathy, and the political expression of increasingly clear racial interests.
The implicit indentarianism of the Republican Party already means that whites must be much more motivated by ideology or party platform to vote Democrat rather than Republican. For Democrats, the same can be said for Jews and Asians, whose economic interests would be best served by the Republican Party but who vote Democrat instead.
In the future, the degree of political motivation required for whites to vote Democrat will only increase, so that only the most radical and committed left-wing whites will continue to vote Democrat.
Some will say that if whites become a minority, surely it doesn’t matter who they vote for, especially if a significant portion of them continue to vote with the non-white majority.
This view hinges on the idea that being a minority implies a united majority opposed to that minority, in a kind of zero-sum game. This is far from the case, but it is easy to see why Americans think this way, conditioned as they are to a two-party system.
Despite the dominance of the duopoly, America has an interesting history of third-party politics, including the efforts of the Libertarian Party in the recent elections, which, according to VDARE.com, may have cost the Republicans a senate seat:
Libertarian Robert Sarvis took 53,000 votes in the Old Dominion, far greater than Republican Ed Gillespie’s losing margin of 16,700. That’s a significant 2.5 percent. As the Washington Post’s Norman Leahy and Paul Goldman gloated, ‘2014 is apparently the first time in Virginia that a protest candidate decided the outcome of a major election.’
A better example is the presidential campaign of Al Gore. One reason often cited for his narrow failure to become president was the 2.74 percent of the vote that went to Ralph Nader’s Green Party, which took many more votes from the Democrats than from the Republicans. Similarly, how much of Bill Clinton’s success was due to the spoiler role that Ross Perot’s 19 percent and 8 percent of the vote played in the 1992 and 1996 elections?
In a two-party system, where the two main parties have a tendency to converge on a center by adjusting their policies to counteract each other, and where winning margins are typically narrow, a third or even fourth party’s spoiler effect has the potential to shift the results dramatically.
History shows that both Democrats and Republicans are vulnerable to this threat, but how will this vulnerability be impacted by demographic change? Consider the Libertarian Party’s effect on the Virginia mid-terms. The party appeals to a small, overwhelmingly white group of voters, but even to get a small percentage of whites to vote for it required that it have a well worked out economic and political theory and some kind of track record: The party has existed since the 1970s and has been scoring over a million votes at most presidential elections for over a decade.
Still, part of the Libertarian Party’s limited success stems from the apathy that whites feel towards the “main white party.” As whites diminish as a percentage and identitarian sentiments strengthen, the ground becomes even less fertile for parties like the Libertarians, who could see their support drawn off yet further by the eventual emergence of an explicitly white party.
It is obvious that the Democrats are inherently less unified than the Republicans, and more prone to defection. It would be easy to start a third party that appealed to parts of the Democratic Party’s coalition of races. Any such party would simply need to declare its advocacy of black or Hispanic interests in a context in which voting for it would produce perceived benefits, even if they were only emotional.
Let us imagine a Democratic administration forced to implement a policy of austerity in a metropolitan area with a majority black population, or having to enforce order over an issue of race and policing, as is now the case in Ferguson. Any reasonably organized and funded black party rising up to challenge the Democrats’ usual tack to the center would be able to shave off at least a few percentage points, and success would breed further success.
The biggest obstacle to this happening, however, is the inability or unwillingness of the members of the uneasy Democratic coalition to start their own parties. Jews or Asians could certainly do so, but would be unwilling. Blacks and Hispanics might be unable to create effective parties, though movements such as the Nation of Islam and La Raza suggest a willingness.
Something, somewhere has got to give. The more the anti-white coalition of the future hangs together, the more it will galvanize the identitarianism of the biggest and most powerful group–whites themselves–with their vast financial resources, especially as these come under attack from non-white politicians promoting redistribution of wealth under the banner of social justice. Under these conditions, it is unlikely that the Democratic coalition could hold together indefinitely. Jews, Asians, or white Hispanics would break ranks.
Let us therefore imagine a projection of current trends: Reduction of whites to a minority and the ethno-politicization of the two-party system leads to an increasingly identitarian Republican Party and an increasingly fragile anti-white coalition based in the Democratic Party. Perhaps the best option for whites would then be to encourage and even covertly to fund identitarian third parties that could split the anti-white Democratic vote. Once non-whites start to vote outside their coalition the breakup would hopefully become irreversible.
If the Democratic Party splits into warring racial factions, the white minority–as the largest minority–would be in a position once again to gain an overwhelming majority of the power, despite being a minority. This is because, unlike most European nations, the American voting system is not proportional but instead favors whichever party can get its nose in front of its rivals.
Back in the 1990s, when Ross Perot was playing an important spoiler role, Clinton did not need a majority to win a landslide in the Electoral College. He did that with only 43 percent of the vote. Something similar is likely to happen either shortly before whites become a minority or shortly after. Such an outcome will of necessity involve much greater white racial consciousness. This window of opportunity for increased power for whites will remain open for only a few years. Whites will eventually be pushed aside demographically, so it will be vital for them to find a way of using their Indian Summer of power to ensure their survival.
This could be done either by changing the voting system, partitioning parts of the country, or by encouraging emigration of non-whites and immigration of whites from South Africa, Eastern Europe, and South America.
In the run-up to this scenario it will also be vital for whites to avoid two things: political fragmentation and proportional representation. At present, the Republican Party may look like a curse, but in the future, one big party in the face of splintered opposition could prove vital to a racially conscious white minority seizing control of its country again, even if only for the last time.